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ABSTRACT
From a handling perspective, any spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that has lost its 
original technical and functional design capabilities with regard to handling and 
confinement can be considered as damaged. Some SNF was damaged as a result 
of experimental activities and destructive examinations; incidents during 
packaging, handling, and transportation; or degradation that has occurred during 
storage. Some SNF was mechanically destroyed to protect proprietary SNF 
designs. Examples of damage to the SNF include failed cladding, failed fuel 
meat, sectioned test specimens, partially reprocessed SNFs, over-heated 
elements, dismantled assemblies, and assemblies with lifting fixtures removed. In 
spite of the challenges involved with handling and storage of damaged SNF, the 
SNF has been safely handled and stored for many years at DOE storage facilities. 
This report summarizes a variety of challenges encountered at DOE facilities 
during interim storage and handling operations along with strategies and 
solutions that are planned or were implemented to ameliorate those challenges. A 
discussion of proposed paths forward for moving damaged and nondamaged SNF 
from interim storage to final disposition in the geologic repository is also 
presented.
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vSUMMARY 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for storage and final 
disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that spans several decades of nuclear 
research and defense-related material production. To support nuclear 
nonproliferation objectives, DOE is retrieving many foreign research reactor fuels. 
These DOE fuels, which have been stored at many different foreign and domestic 
sites in various configurations and under a variety of conditions, are being 
consolidated for interim storage at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the 
Hanford Site, and the Savannah River Site.  
SNF in DOE custody consists of several hundred different SNF types. 
These SNFs come from a wide range of reactor types with various SNF 
compounds, cladding materials, and enrichments. Some of these SNFs are 
damaged as a result of experimental activities and destructive examinations; 
incidents during packaging, handling, and transportation; or degradation that has 
occurred during storage. In spite of the challenges involved with damaged SNFs, 
these SNFs have been safely handled and stored for many years at DOE storage 
facilities.
This report summarizes some of the challenges encountered and solutions 
implemented to ensure safe storage and handling of damaged SNFs. It includes a 
brief summary of some SNF storage environments and resulting SNF degradation, 
experience handling and repackaging significantly degraded SNFs, and the 
associated lessons learned. 
Final disposition of these SNFs will require additional handling and, in 
some cases, additional repackaging and characterization. This report provides a 
brief overview of strategies being implemented to minimize the costs and 
radiological exposure associated with additional analyses, characterization, and 
repackaging that may be needed to qualify these SNFs for emplacement in a 
geologic repository. 
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1Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel at U.S. DOE Facilities, 
Experience and Lessons Learned 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for storage and final disposition of spent 
nuclear fuel (SNF) that spans several decades of nuclear research and defense-related material production. 
To support nuclear nonproliferation objectives, DOE is retrieving many foreign research reactor SNFs. 
These DOE SNFs, which have been stored at many different foreign and domestic sites in various 
configurations and under a variety of conditions, are being consolidated for interim storage at three major 
sites across the United States, namely, the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the Hanford Site, and the 
Savannah River Site (SRS). SNF in DOE custody consists of several hundred different fuel types. These 
SNFs come from a wide range of reactor types, such as light and heavy water moderated reactors, 
graphite-moderated reactors, breeder reactors, with various fuel compounds, cladding materials, and 
enrichments. 
From a handling perspective, any SNF that has lost its original technical and functional design 
capabilities with regard to handling and/or confinement can be considered as damaged. Some of this SNF 
was damaged as a result of experimental activities and destructive examinations; inadvertently damaged 
in the reactor, or from incidents during packaging, handling, and transportation; or degradation that has 
occurred during storage. Some SNF was mechanically destroyed to protect proprietary SNF designs. 
Examples of damage to the SNF include failed cladding, failed fuel meat, sectioned test specimens, 
partially reprocessed SNFs, over-heated elements, dismantled assemblies, and assemblies with lifting 
fixtures removed. In spite of the challenges involved with handling and storage of damaged SNF, the SNF 
has been safely handled and stored for many years at DOE storage facilities. 
This report summarizes a variety of challenges encountered at DOE facilities during interim 
storage and handling operations. This report also discusses strategies and solutions that are planned or 
were implemented to ameliorate those challenges. A discussion of proposed paths forward for moving 
damaged and nondamaged SNF from interim storage to final disposition in the geologic repository is also 
presented.
2. WATER CHEMISTRY 
SNF has historically been stored underwater to provide sufficient decay prior to SNF reprocessing 
or dry storage. The water provides heat removal, radiological shielding for personnel working in the 
facility, and confinement of certain fission products. Underwater storage exposes SNF and packaging to 
the potential for galvanic corrosion. The potential also exists for contamination or corrosion from other 
materials within the pool, such as chlorine. The presence of chlorides, in particular, can contribute to 
packaging and fuel corrosion. Within the past, chlorine was sometimes added as a biocide. Degradation of 
uncoated concrete basins that store the SNF can also contribute to contamination of the basin water with 
chlorides and metal ions that can corrode metal cladding and structural materials. Stainless steel is a good 
material for most interim storage but not, as expected, for a high chloride environment. If proper water 
chemistry is maintained, the stainless steel provides a robust storage design. 
Water chemistry is typically controlled to mitigate fuel corrosion. Basin storage systems include 
stainless steel liners (with leak detection) and filter and deionization systems to maintain basin chemistry 
and to provide radioactivity removal from the water. Historically, water basin chemistry often has not 
been as tightly controlled as required to maintain a noncorrosive environment for extended SNF storage. 
2Degraded water quality and extended storage periods permit container and SNF degradation, which may 
lead to breach of containment and release of the radionuclides, and compromise the ability to handle the 
containers.
2.1 Water Chemistry-Related Degradation 
Aluminum-based fuel is typically clad with low alloy aluminum. Aluminum alloy cladding and 
storage system materials are particularly subject to corrosion damage during storage in water basins that 
have an aggressive water chemistry. Consequently, aluminum is a material to be used with care both as a 
canister material and as a structural material for holding canisters in a water basin. Various corrosion 
modes that can lead to cladding penetration within a year of exposure to aggressive water chemistries 
include pitting, crevice, and galvanic corrosion. Microbiologically influenced corrosion has also been 
reported to attack aluminum cladding materials in basin storage. 
During the early INL basin storage of SNAP SNF in aluminum containers, basin water chemical 
interactions resulted in the metal of the cans corroding. The corrosion eventually became severe enough 
that the SNF fell through some of the storage cans to the basin bottom. In this case, the SNF was 
recovered, without incident, and repackaged in stainless steel cans for ongoing storage where it currently 
remains. 
Figures 1 and 2 are photographs of advanced localized corrosion damage to aluminum-based fuel. 
If aluminum is to be used in a water storage environment, control of water chemistry is essential. 
Reference 1 provides a guide describing water chemistry conditions to avoid corrosion damage to 
aluminum-clad fuel. 
Deposits of aluminum hydroxide films on zircaloy clad SNF have also been observed after 
extended water basin storage in aluminum canisters. Radiolysis of water associated with these films can 
cause storage container pressurization, weld embrittlement, and flammable gas generation. 
Figure 1. Materials Testing Reactor type assembly with pit corrosion damage on fuel plate cladding over 
fuel material region. 
3Figure 2. Materials Test Reactor type assembly with side plate damage. 
Such issues are controlled through proper water chemistry, which is facilitated by updated basin 
water control systems. In general, water chemistry issues within DOE facilities are associated with older 
storage facilities. Water chemistry specifications typically define pH, chloride concentration, 
conductivity, and basin water temperature. These parameters should be defined in the region that does not 
accelerate corrosion of materials. Water quality standards for current generation INL facilities limit 
chlorides to less than 1 ppm and conductivity to less than 2 microsiemens/cm. Conductivity provides an 
indirect measure of pH. Consequently, if conductivity is carefully controlled, addition controls on the pH 
levels are not necessary. Basin water temperatures are allowed to fluctuate between ~55 and 85qF. The 
fluctuating basin temperatures help make the water less hospitable to biological growth. 
2.2 Estimating Water Quality Impacts from Storage of Damaged SNF 
Exposure of damaged SNF to water in any storage configuration can have deleterious effects. 
Damaged SNF may have compromised cladding, fuel assembly structural materials, or both. Thus the 
ability of the fuel assembly to maintain confinement of the fission products is compromised. This may be 
an issue for continued storage and handling of the fuel in water basins because radionuclides can be 
released from the fuel causing contamination issues and operations exposure hazards. However, continued 
storage without placement of SNF in canisters may be feasible for some SNF with breached cladding. A 
simple methodology can be implemented to estimate the degree of water contamination that results from 
placement of uncanistered damaged SNF into a basin. 
At the low temperatures typical of basin storage (approximately room temperature), corrosion is 
the primary mechanism whereby species from the fuel core are released into the water. That is, diffusion 
transport of species from regions in the fuel core to the exposed fuel surface and direct release are not 
significant. The predominant species affecting basin activity is the 137Cs. Gaseous and volatile species, 
such as krypton and xenon, are minor sources of radioactivity from breached fuel that are released from 
the basin system and are not significant to operations. Therefore, the estimation of radioactivity release 
rates from aluminum-based fuel into the basin water focuses on the release rate of 137Cs. The 137Cs is 
assumed to be fully soluble and free to disperse into the basin water and is not bound in the corrosion 
product. A simple model to estimate the release from fuel core is given by: 
RDF = AF x B x C (1)
where
4RDF is the 137Cs release rate [Ci/hr] from the damaged fuel 
AF is the 137Cs activity density in the fuel meat material at the decay time of interest [Ci/cm3]
B is the area of fuel exposed to the environment (area of breach) [cm2]
C is the general corrosion rate of the fuel core material in the environment of exposure [cm/hr]. 
Basin water radioactivity can be controlled through removal of the activity via a resin deionizer. 
The activity concentration of the basin is directly related to the flow rate through the deionizer and the 
release rate of 137Cs from the existing basin sources. Assuming essentially 100% removal efficiency by 
the deionizers, the steady-state 137Cs activity is estimated by the following: 
AW = R/Q (2)
where
AW is the steady-state 137Cs activity of the water [Ci/gal] 
R is the total 137Cs release rate into the basins and includes the contribution from the damaged 
fuel (i.e., RDF as calculated above) and from any other materials stored in the basin 
(Ci/hr)
Q is the flow rate through the deionization system [gal/hr] 
Given the 137Cs release rate to the basin, this equation may be used to estimate the steady state 
activity of the basin water as a function of the flow rate through the de-ionization system. Calculations for 
the SRS L-Basin show that large inventories of damaged aluminum-based fuels can be stored in the basin 
without a significant increase in basin activity levels.2 The method can be applied to other SNFs by 
applying fuel-specific general corrosion rates and surface areas presented during degradation. 
3. FUEL/WATER INTERACTIONS 
Damaged SNF was routinely placed in canisters for interim storage to protect the storage facilities 
from contamination and to protect the SNF in the wet storage environment. These canisters were usually 
made from stainless steel or aluminum. Some SNF that could react with water was sealed in canisters 
with an inert cover gas to provide a dry, neutral environment for the SNF. The containers were then 
placed in wet basin storage. A fraction of these sealed containers have leaked and unintentionally exposed 
the SNF directly to water. 
3.1 Spent Nuclear Fuel-Specific Experience 
3.1.1 Uranium Metal Spent Nuclear Fuel 
The uranium metal SNF within the DOE inventory contains many elements whose cladding was 
breached during reactor discharge, subsequent handling, or storage. Initial cladding failures varied from 
minor cracks to severed fuel elements. The reaction of exposed uranium metal with water produces 
uranium dioxide and hydrogen. This reaction is not a result of chemical impurity of the basin water. It is a 
chemical reaction of the water with the uranium metal. Uranium hydride forms from the available 
hydrogen, particularly where there is a limited amount of oxygen (see Reference 3). The lower densities 
of the uranium oxide and uranium hydride products relative to the uranium metal cause swelling of the 
5material within the cladding and subsequent additional cladding damage. Additional water reaction then 
occurs with the newly exposed uranium metal. Each cycle of fuel-water reaction results in fission product 
releases and contamination of water in the canister or the storage pool. Examples of uranium metal SNF 
element damage after extended water storage are shown in Figure 3. In extreme cases, the uranium metal 
has also been known to completely oxidize and form a mud-like mixture with the water.4
The generation of high surface area uranium metal SNF fragments and uranium hydride necessitates 
additional measures during SNF drying, dry storage, and transportation because of the pyrophoric nature 
of these materials when exposed to air. As a result, degraded uranium metal fuels are stored and 
transported in inerted canisters after removal from the basin and drying. Radiolysis of water within the 
SNF-water corrosion products must also be addressed for long-term storage because of the ability of the 
resultant gases to overpressurize containers, embrittle welds on containers, and reach flammable 
concentrations.
3.1.2 Sodium-Bonded Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Metallic sodium-bonded metal SNF has been stored underwater in an inert gas inside of sealed 
stainless steel canisters. Water ingress through leaks in canister fittings has resulted in water (containing 
Figure 3. Examples of uranium metal fuel damage. 
chlorides) reaction with cladding and eventually with the sodium metal, producing sodium hydroxide and 
hydrogen gas. Ultrasonic testing at Materials and Fuel Complex, formerly Argonne National Laboratory-
West5,6 and now a part of the INL, has indicated that further reactions with the SNF have resulted in 
complete degradation of the SNF material and production of a fuel sludge.  
3.1.3 Uranium Carbide Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Uranium carbide fuel is used in gas-cooled reactors. Uranium carbide material is highly reactive 
with water, and basin storage is, therefore, not a viable storage system. Uranium carbide SNFs have been 
stored in dry wells. The storage system did not adequately prevent condensation of water and subsequent 
metallic carbide-water reactions. Reaction products include acetylene and other hydrocarbons. At the 
6INL, this situation was detected when off-gas measurements from Peach Bottom SNF in dry storage 
indicated the presence of flammable gas. The control strategy implemented is the periodic purging of the 
storage with replacement gas before flammable gas concentration reached levels sufficient to be a 
problem. 
4. SNF Drying 
Water is generally problematic for SNF storage (see Sections 2 and 3). However, most SNFs have 
been wet at some time in their life. Transfer to dry storage usually requires removal of the water during 
the handling and repackaging process. If water remains with the SNF configuration material interactions 
may result in SNF degradation and pressurization of the container. This requires deriving data on the 
amount of water in the SNF storage configuration and actions to remove the water, including physical 
drying of the SNF. 
To effectively mitigate the hazards caused by water, the storage environment and water content in 
the SNF configuration must be understood. To accurately evaluate the effects of water in a SNF storage 
package, one must determine the amount of free water, free water, and chemically bound water in the 
configuration. Damaged SNF complicates this determination because of the additional potential for free, 
physically absorbed, and chemically bound water, to be retained in corrosion product and porous 
materials. A fuel’s drying characteristics are also affected by its packaging (e.g., buckets, baskets cans), 
packaging geometry (e.g., corroded cylindrical can, inside a cylindrical overpack can with a rectangular 
flanged lid, inside a rectangular bucket), materials that comprise the packaging (e.g., stainless steel 
overpack can, aluminum inner can), and any other materials contained in the packaging with the SNF 
(e.g., water, basin silt, epoxy, corrosion products, biofilms). 
4.1.1 Need for Drying Standards and Supporting Data 
The amount of free water on a SNF can be difficult to determine because of complicated 
geometries, unknown porosities, and debris. Many SNFs types have multiple plates and crevices to trap 
water. Corrosion penetrations can allow water to enter pores in the fuel matrix and small gaps between the 
fuel matrix and cladding (e.g., corroded aluminum clad TRIGA). Debris, such as fuel pieces, container 
corrosion product, and basin silt, can trap water in fuel features or plug container drain holes. 
Fuel configuration specific data that are necessary to determine physically and chemically adsorbed 
water content as a function of temperature and, to a lesser extent, pressure are difficult to obtain. The lack 
of fuel configuration specific data on physically and chemically bound water content and the temperature, 
pressure, and time required to free this water, has prevented water content from being accurately 
determined. Important factors affecting the amount of bound water in damaged fuel configurations are 
the:
1. Amounts and types of corroded materials (e.g., cladding, fuel matrix, containers, debris) 
2. Corrosion layer thickness  
3. Corrosion layer composition 
4. Rate and extent of radiolysis of bound water 
5. Amount and types of nonfuel materials (e.g., basin silt, bio-films, epoxy). 
7Historically, applicable test data have been unavailable. Literature data on specific materials is 
sometimes available. Even when data are available on a specific material, it can be difficult to apply these 
data. For example, to estimate the bound water content of an aluminum clad SNF configuration, one must 
know the thickness of the aluminum oxide corrosion layer on the SNF element, the form of the aluminum 
oxide (bayerite, gibbsite, boehmite, etc.), the porosity of the corrosion layer, the other constituents in the 
corrosion layer (basin silt, bio-films), the amount of corroded aluminum from current or prior containers 
present, etc. Depending on various postulated accidents, the available data on the specific material may or 
may not meet the rigor necessary to ensure safe handling and storage of the damaged SNF. As a 
hypothetical example, if a sealed SNF container was limited to 2000 g of free water, had an internal void 
volume of about 205 L, and the temperature was allowed to increase to 400°C, the pressure could increase 
to 440 psia due to free water vapor. This increase does not take into account pressure contributions from 
bound water released, radiolysis, radiogenic gases, or inert backfill gases such as helium. For this 
scenario, the SNF container would have to be able to withstand this pressure, or the temperature and/or 
water content limits would have to be reduced accordingly. 
As an example, consider an actual proposed disposal configuration for TRIGA SNF. The disposal 
configuration is in an 18-in.-diameter, 10-ft-long standardized DOE canister (see Section 9). This 
configuration has a void volume of about 205 L. The SNF in this configuration has a mass of 
approximately 368,000 g. One could reasonably assume a free water content of 2000 g because that 
would be less than 0.5% by mass. Also, the proposed disposal configuration includes 7200 g of 
gadolinium phosphate beads inside the canister to aid in criticality control. The 7200 g of gadolinium 
phosphate beads could contain over 900 g of physically and chemically bound water.7 If this bound water 
is released by temperature and/or radiolysis it could contribute nearly half of the assumed 2000 g water 
content limit. 
Because packaging configurations and conditions like these are possible, adequate drying must be 
ensured before sealing damaged SNF in containers. Although difficult to obtain, these data may be 
necessary to ensure damaged SNF is properly dried before being sealed in canisters. In the absence of 
clear drying standards or supporting data, monitoring programs and engineered controls may be put in 
place to prevent excessive pressure. 
4.1.2 Repackaging Considerations and Strategies 
There are several issues to be considered when repackaging damaged SNF to reduce future 
problems and costs associated with drying the SNF. Significant quantities of the INL damaged SNFs were 
packaged in aluminum containers that were later placed into another overpack container. Some damaged 
SNFs were further over packed a second time in nondraining containers when the first package became 
compromised. (A description of TORY-IIA repackaging is in Appendix B) Overpacking adds thermal 
mass, may increase free water, may increase corrosion product, decrease storage density, and restrict 
removal of water; all of which complicate future handling. The list below summarizes key lessons learned 
from the DOE experiences that can impact removing water from damaged SNFs. These items should be 
considered when handling and repackaging damaged SNFs. 
x Overpacking can restrict the pathway for water removal from the container and reduce the heat 
transfer when drying. Containers designed with more open structures improve heat transfer and 
allow convective airflow to help transport vapor from the container. 
x Drying SNF solely by forced convection using heated gases is inefficient. Vacuum drying at 
elevated temperatures has proven to be most effective. Heating of the fuel configurations using 
conduction and radiant heat transfer principles has been the least costly and most efficient. 
8x Drainable containers are advantageous when SNF is removed from water storage. This reduces the 
free water retained. A container design incorporating screened holes near the bottom has proven 
effective for several operations handling severely damaged SNF. The holes allow water to drain, 
and the screens help to retain degraded fuel material in the can. This can significantly reduce the 
amount of water that must be removed by the vacuum system.  
5. OXIDATION OF URANIUM DIOXIDE SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL 
DOE manages a variety of uranium dioxide SNF inventories that were used to support reactor 
development, enhanced SNF designs, spent fuel storage system development, and repository performance 
assessment activities. Most of this SNF inventory has intact cladding with no observed defects. In some 
instances, the SNF cladding is breached as a result of the testing activities. An estimated 2 to 4% of the 
SNF assemblies within the DOE inventory have at least one failed rod with breaches greater than pinhole 
leaks or hairline cracks.
5.1 Factors Affecting Uranium Dioxide Oxidation 
A primary consideration for handling and storage of these SNF inventories is the potential for 
oxidation of the uranium dioxide fuel meat to U3O8 when exposed to oxygen at elevated temperatures. 
Oxidation occurs through pinhole leaks, hairline cracks, and gross cladding defects. Formation of the less 
dense U3O8 causes the fuel meat to swell and split the cladding, referred to as unzipping. This releases 
radioactive particulate and fission gases and exposes additional fuel for potential oxidation. Release of 
particulate from the cladding can affect criticality safety, control of contamination, worker exposure, and 
future SNF retrievability. 
Time and temperature are the primary factors affecting the extent of oxidation. An apparent 
damage threshold has been observed at about 300ºC. At 350ºC, about 20% of a standard SNF rod has 
been observed to unzip in a period of 500 hours. At 400ºC, about 15% of a fuel rod has been observed to 
unzip in only 100 hours. Examples of cladding damage from unzipping are shown in Figure 4 from 
experiments at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.8
5.2 Cask Contamination 
Damaged SNF and damaged containers have the potential to contaminate transport casks. One such 
incident, discussed in detail in Appendix A, occurred in 1980. A NAC-1E cask, was loaded with a failed 
fuel assembly, which underwent further cladding degradation in transport. As a consequence of the 
cladding degradation, the cask was internally contaminated with spent fuel residue. The cask was filled 
with air when packaged. Delays in shipment, combined with errors in realizing the heat output from the 
SNF, resulted in high temperatures within the cask. This high temperature facilitated the scavenging of 
oxygen from the air by the exposed fuel at the points of cladding failure, creating U3O8. This larger  
9Figure 4. Examples of cladding damage for experiments at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 
molecule enlarged the existing cladding breaks allowing this conversion of additional exposed fuel. This 
particular scavenging phenomenon was previously unknown. When the cask was received and unloaded, 
a contamination incident occurred because of the reaction of the SNF, air, and water. Because of handling 
issues, the cask sat idle for several years until it was cleaned with hydrofluoric acid and recertified for 
service. One result of this incident is the requirement for an inert gas to be used as a cover gas for SNF 
shipments.
5.3 Uranium Dioxide Oxidation Control Measures 
To minimize the extent that oxidation of the uranium dioxide can occur, the following measures 
have been used at DOE facilities: (a) establishing time limits for exposure of fuel pins to air based on 
thermal analysis to minimize oxidation rates, (b) using inert environments in leak tight containers to limit 
access of oxygen to the fuel, and (c) maintaining wet storage of fuel until sufficient decay to limit storage 
temperatures. Where cladding failures have been observed, fuel has been canned and stored within an 
inert environment that ensures fuel particulate is maintained within a safe and retrievable configuration. 
The measures to control uranium dioxide oxidation are important during all phases of spent fuel 
management, including storage, transport, and implementation of final disposition. The SNF is 
particularly vulnerable during transfer from one controlled environment to the next, such as during cask 
loading and unloading. Inerted hot cells may be used during these transfers when necessitated by the SNF 
decay heat and the amount of time to complete the transfer operation. 
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6. EXTENDED INTERIM STORAGE PERIODS 
A common difficulty for handling some damaged SNF is policy and scheduling changes that 
extend the planned interim storage duration or change the planned disposition. Through the years, DOE 
has received nuclear materials from many locations and reprocessed the material to recover the fissile 
materials. The interim material storage conditions were based on the criteria that the material would only 
be in storage for a short time. Therefore, the storage environment and conditions often did not address 
long-term storage issues and requirements. For example, as storage periods were extended, many fuels 
were moved from wet to dry storage. The issues associated with dry storage were often not considered 
when fuels were packaged. The inclusion of extraneous materials with the SNF and the design of lifting 
and handling fixtures are examples. 
6.1 Container Materials 
Damaged SNF was intentionally placed into temporary containers that were compatible with the 
reprocessing dissolvers rather than containers designed for long-term storage. Aluminum was often 
selected for storage containers because it would facilitate reprocessing of the contained SNF in a 
dissolution process. However, aluminum proved to be a problem when water quality was not maintained 
and storage durations were extended. When reprocessing operations were delayed, the containers 
corroded, and the degraded SNF was exposed to the wet storage environment. As storage of these 
materials was extended, often more than once, the design life of the container or SNF cladding often 
became problematic. In many of these cases, the original container was placed in another container. In a 
few cases, the second container degraded to the point of requiring placement in a third container. This 
container compounding was a stop-gap measure, and that did not correct the original problem. These 
multiple packages will increase repackaging costs at the time of disposal because of the need to open each 
container to perform final packaging for disposition. 
Experience has also shown that corrosion allowances require careful evaluation during planning for 
the storage and are dependent on the term of the storage, the storage environment, and should include an 
allowance for storage beyond the planned storage period to provide some margin for change to the 
planning basis. For example, based on current legal requirements to remove all DOE SNF from Idaho 
by 2035, the INL is currently planning movement of SNF to interim storage through 2035 and is creating 
an appropriate corrosion allowance on storage canisters to support that storage period. 
6.2 Extraneous Materials 
Extraneous materials placed in SNF canisters can cause difficulties when preparing the SNF for 
interim storage or disposal. There have been cases of items such as gloves, debris, and other materials 
being inadvertently placed in a canister, creating downstream difficulty with repackaging, drying, or other 
operations. At a minimum, such material creates excess contaminated material to be disposed of.  
One such example is the use of epoxies to stabilize disrupted or sectioned fuel pieces. Stabilization 
is sometimes required for handling the fuel pieces during and after postirradiation examinations. In dry 
storage and in handling conditions, epoxy can affect the nuclear reactivity of a SNF package. Epoxy also 
has implications for toxicity and flammability at elevated temperatures required for water removal and 
may affect the acceptability of the SNF for disposal. Further, the characteristics of epoxy compounds in 
various handling and storage conditions, such as radiation fields and high temperatures, are not well 
documented. As an example, it is understood that the formation of hydrogen and phenol are potential 
hazards when the compounds are at elevated temperatures but the nature of off-gasing has not been fully 
examined and documented. 
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Conclusive evaluations on the effects of epoxies for the previously stated conditions can be further 
complicated by the use of different types of epoxies, each having their own unique performance 
characteristics in radiation fields and high temperatures. As an example, at one DOE examination facility, 
at least seven different types of epoxy compounds (Armstrong, C-7, Spurr, Buehler, Dow Epoxy Resin, 
Araldite, and Acme Maraglass) and a phenol compound (Bakelite) were used in various testing programs. 
The damaged fuel pieces were combined without segregation and often without into storage containers. 
This situation has been problematic for handling and storage and may also complicate strategies for 
disposal of the damaged SNF. Other materials that may become problematic in fuel packages are 
desiccants and grouting mixtures. This issue shows the need for foresight and careful consideration when 
combining damaged SNFs with extraneous materials. 
6.3 Lifting and Handling Fixtures 
Fuel rods or assemblies are typically designed to include an integral lifting and handling fixture. 
SNFs that are otherwise undamaged sometimes have their lifting fixtures removed. Cropping of lifting 
fixtures and other nonfuel items from an element or disassembling an element often was done to conserve 
SNF storage space, to fit the SNF into specific shipping containers, or to allow the SNF to be studied. 
Historically, this was often done to reduce the amount of non-SNF material that had to be dissolved when 
the SNF was reprocessed, thus reducing the processing time and high-level liquid waste generated. 
SNFs that have intact cladding, but have had their lifting fixtures removed, present several unique 
issues and challenges. Cropping or disassembly criteria were often based on a specific facility with 
specific SNF handling capabilities. For example, the cropping criteria may be developed for underwater 
handling where operators can control handling tools hands-on. However, when the SNF is moved to a hot 
cell where all operations are remote, the lack of in-cell dexterity severely hinders the SNF handling 
operations. Similarly, many lid designs have the canister lifting fixtures affixed to the lid. When the 
container lid is removed, the lifting fixture is lost, and handling the canister becomes a challenge. 
An example of this is the case where end boxes are cut from plate type SNFs. In most of these 
cases, the fuel can be picked up in a storage basin with some specific methods and tools that only 
minimally increase operational difficulty. However, most fuels will eventually be moved to dry interim 
storage, and the same methods are generally not effective in a remote environment where operations 
involve mechanical or electromechanical manipulators that lack the dexterity and reliability of underwater 
tools, thus increasing operational difficulty. These challenges can be avoided with proper foresight and 
consideration when modifying fuel element lifting fixtures. 
During dry cell operations, the consequences of dropping damaged SNF or a SNF package are 
usually more severe, and the recovery efforts are more difficult than underwater. Whenever possible, 
remote lifting tools should be designed with positive latching mechanisms that allow visual verification of 
proper latching. Like the positive latching and visual verification required for the tool to the SNF, the tool 
should also be positively latched with visual verification, to the lifting device to which it is attached. The 
design of such tools can further be a challenge where space and visibility is limited around fuel elements. 
A further challenge is to design tools that can recover from scenarios wherein the tool’s releasing 
mechanism fails and the tool cannot be released from the fuel lifting fixture. DOE facilities have 
developed several methods to ensure these functional requirements are safely met. Examples are 
providing redundant and independent release mechanisms and at least two independent methods for doing 
all remote activities. 
The difficulty of meeting the above-mentioned tool design constraints is compounded by having 
many different types of damaged fuel elements and many different fuel container lifting fixtures with 
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container specific tools. In many cases SNF has to be received by facilities with little or no input on the 
design of the lifting and handling fixtures. This necessitates designing unique remote handling tools for 
each distinctive lifting fixture and sometimes requires tools to be changed frequently during a SNF 
handling operation. Effective interfaces and early interaction between shipping and receiving facilities 
can significantly improve tool design and operational effectiveness. 
7. MATERIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECORD KEEPING 
Fundamental to accounting for and controlling of nuclear materials are fuel item identification, 
item weighing (mass), and nondestructive assayeither through confirmatory measurements or 
accountability/verification measurements. Performance of these actions is essential to ensure that the fuel 
item identification numbers and their associated nuclear material quantities are physically present. 
The situation exists where identification numbers on damaged fuel elements have been corroded or 
damaged. As an example, some aluminum clad TRIGA elements were corroded such that the end caps 
that had the identification numbers had fallen off the elements. This issue was addressed by combining 
elements into a new package and creating appropriate records to ensure that accountability was preserved. 
Another accountability issue arises for more severely damaged fuel elements where accountable 
material may have degraded to debris or even sludge. In such cases, accountability requirements are 
challenging without the capabilities to perform confirmatory measures on the material during handling. 
The problems can be further complicated where the repackaging has not previously (or cannot now) be 
done one for one. In other words, the debris from the original container is not repackaged entirely into 
another container. If contents must be separated or combined with the contents from different containers, 
the accountability process may require additional constraints or controls on the packaging and associated 
records unless the proper equipment to weigh and characterize the materials is available. While all 
material is still accounted for overall, the specific distribution of material per package within a set of 
containers may be questionable. Further, assigning conservatively high fissile values to each container for 
safety basis purposes increases handling and disposition costs. 
Unirradiated, slightly irradiated, and moderately irradiated fuel elements are susceptible to 
performance of measurements using current nondestructive assay methodologies. Neutron interrogation 
methods for confirmatory measurements are available for highly irradiated fuels. However, efforts to 
reduce dose levels to operators and measurement personnel require further development for improved fuel 
handling isolation and dose mitigation designs within facilities before the current interrogation 
capabilities can be effectively implemented. 
8. CANISTER DESIGN FOR DAMAGED SNF 
Experience has shown that special design features for the canister may be needed, dependent on the 
SNF type and condition. Damaged/degraded cladding or structural features of a SNF assembly, if 
significant, can result in radiological, criticality safety, waste, and accountability issues. Placing the 
damaged SNF assembly in an isolation canister has been a common solution to prevent these more 
widespread problems. The canister provides necessary design features that were once performed by the 
SNF structure and cladding. Design features and considerations relevant to canisters for damaged SNF 
isolation are presented in Appendix C. 
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9. STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE 
The United States is preparing for disposition of much of its SNF inventory, including damaged 
SNFs, in the Monitored Geologic Repository currently under development at Yucca Mountain in the state 
of Nevada. Detailed analysis and design activities are required to prepare and submit a license for the 
repository to operate under license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
The major disposition strategy supported by these analyses is use of the DOE standard canister to 
facilitate interim storage, handling, and eventual disposal of a wide variety of DOE SNFs. Design 
considerations for standardized canisters include items such as canister survivability, the need for neutron 
absorbers, and radiological source term evaluations of the canister contents. Standardized canisters not 
only provide for a standardized package to facilitate handling, transport, and disposal of a wide variety of 
spent nuclear fuels, they also provide a containment boundary that significantly reduces the need for 
detailed characterization of the canister contents in subsequent analyses. The description of these canisters 
and the analyses that support their design and other licensing information are discussed in the following 
sections.
9.1 General Canister Descriptions 
The term “standard canister” is used to refer to 2 canister designs. The first of these, the DOE 
standardized canister will accommodate most the DOE SNF intended for disposal in the repository. The 
second of these is the Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO) used by Hanford for packaging of N-reactor SNF. 
Both of the containers are intended to provide uniform handling requirements for design of the repository 
facilities, simplifying handling operations at the repository. The SNF would be packaged at the specific 
sites into the standard canisters, using any required fuel-specific tools at that site. When shipped to the 
repository, these sealed canisters would all have the same handling design, eliminating the need for 
fuel-specific handling tools for each SNF. 
The DOE standardized canister was developed to minimize the need for repacking and to 
standardize fuel handling during interim storage, transport, and final disposal operations. The canister 
incorporates an energy absorbing skirt that protects the top and bottom heads and shell during a potential 
drop or sudden impact. The standardized canister is sufficient to withstand operational loads and 
accidental drops while maintaining containment and to serve as an interim storage package. 
The MCO was initially designed for interim storage to satisfy a near-term need to move the 
N-reactor fuel from water basin storage. DOE has since demonstrated that the MCO can meet the 
operational loads and accidental drops at the repository surface facility and will be analyzing the MCO for 
transportation loads in the near future. 
The overall integrity of the DOE standardized canister and MCOs have been demonstrated through 
analytical modeling and multiple drop tests at varying impact angles followed by helium leak testing. The 
DOE standard canisters are a key component in the licensing strategy for DOE SNF. By demonstrating 
the integrity of the standard canisters for maintaining confinement, safety analysis became relatively 
independent of the canister contents (i.e., no radiation release from the canister). Thus a wide variety of 
SNF, including damaged SNF and SNF that is not characterized fully to Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
standards can be stored, transported, and disposed of without the need to perform detailed 
characterization. DOE Standard canisters are more fully described along with supporting analyses, tests, 
and conclusions relative to its survivability under possible future scenarios are documented in Reference 9 
and briefly summarized below. 
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9.1.1 Material Interaction 
Material interactions considered for the DOE standard canister included the chemical, physical, and 
thermodynamic properties of the materials to be stored in the canisters. Degradation mechanisms that 
were considered include electrochemical interactions such as general corrosion, pitting corrosion, and 
stress corrosion cracking; mechanical forces, such as overpressurization; and metallurgical degradation 
such as hydrogen embrittlement, liquid metal embrittlement, and thermal effects due to welding. It was 
concluded that, if properly dried, there are no significant degradation mechanisms that would cause 
failure of a standardized canister or MCO at nominal repository temperatures of 200qC or even as high as 
350qC. It was further concluded that neither the proposed DOE standardized canister constructed of 
Type 316L stainless steel nor the MCO made with Type 304L stainless steel is expected to be susceptible 
to liquid metal embrittlement due to the presence of cesium and rubidium from the fuel. The canister 
shells are immune to stress corrosion cracking from cesium/rubidium hydroxide based on the experiments 
performed by the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program. After drying and inerting, the DOE standard 
canister degradation is considered negligible. 
9.1.2 High Strain Testing 
A design requirement for the use of the DOE standard canister is to maintain confinement after a 
drop of 23 feet. This requirement is dictated by the maximum lift height during interim storage and 
subsequent handling in the repository surface facility. An evaluation was performed to demonstrate that 
these drops could be reliably modeled on computers using finite element analysis using 
ABAQUS/Explicit software. The use of finite element analysis for elastic structural response has been 
successfully used in numerous industries including the nuclear power industry. Additional testing was 
necessary, however, to obtain a similar level of confidence for plastic analysis technology. Numerous 
drop tests have demonstrated that the standardized canister meets the 23-ft drop requirement and have 
also validated the computer modeling effort.10,11
The effort to model the drop accidents included development of material data to support 
modification to the stress-strain curve to account for strain rate effects under moderate strain rates. This 
material data will be based on limited dynamic material testing at strain levels and strain rates 
approximating what the DOE standard canister is expected to experience during accidental drop events. 
These strain and strain-rate values will be determined from the applicable canister analytical evaluations 
performed to date, which used plastic analysis techniques using ABAQUS/Explicit software. 
9.1.3 Thermal Analysis 
Two thermal analyses were performed to evaluate the allowable decay heat values that could be 
supported by the DOE standardized canisters. The first analysis determined the allowable decay heat 
value that could be supported by the DOE standardized canister oriented vertically in ambient air at 21qC
(70qF) The second analysis determined the allowable decay heat value such that under steady state 
conditions with nine DOE standardized canisters arranged inside a transportation cask, a maximum 
temperature of 316qC (600qF) occurs in the stainless steel wall of any DOE standard canisters. These 
analyses determined administrative controls needed during the transportation of the DOE standardized 
canister in a cask. 
9.2 Advanced Neutron Absorber Development  
Researchers are developing a corrosion-resistant, nickel-chromium-molybdenum alloy containing 
gadolinium for criticality control in the DOE standard canister. Gadolinium has a very high neutron 
absorption cross section. The gadolinium must be alloyed into a corrosion-resistant structural metal that 
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will meet ASME, Section 2 code requirements to be used as a structural material. This alloy may be used 
for the internal baskets of the DOE standardized canister to provide structural support and geometry 
control and to ensure nuclear criticality safety. Use of poison inside the canister allows higher fissile 
loading per canister and provides additional safety margin to accommodate uncertainties associated with 
damaged or poorly characterized SNF. This will reduce the number of canisters and waste packages 
needed for DOE SNF disposal. Researchers are working to define the chemistry ranges and minimum 
mechanical properties for the ASME code case. 
9.3 Fuel Grouping 
The DOE SNF Spent Fuel Database, maintained by the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program with 
input from the individual SNF sites, includes nearly 600 records representing many different SNF types 
with varying operational and storage histories. This posed a challenge in the number of analyses needed 
to support repository design and licensing. The necessary analyses were simplified by categorizing the 
DOE SNF into fuel groups that share properties relevant to preclosure safety analysis, postclosure total 
system performance assessment analysis, and criticality analysis. DOE SNF was grouped by similar 
materials of construction, fuel properties, etc., to arrive at a manageable number of representative groups 
for analyses.12
9.4 Source Term Development 
In order to enable final disposition of SNF, source terms must be provided to support analyses for 
the proposed Monitored Geologic Repository at the Yucca Mountain Site. Source term calculations 
provide estimates of radionuclide inventories that are used in the calculation of decay heat for thermal 
analyses of casks and storage canisters, photon emission spectra for shielding calculations, fissile 
inventory for criticality safety evaluations, and radionuclide doses associated with preclosure and 
postclosure repository safety analyses. 
DOE SNFs come from a wide range of reactor types (such as light and heavy water moderated 
reactors, graphite-moderated reactors, breeder reactors) with various fuel compounds, cladding materials 
and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features such as core 
configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, reflector and coolant materials, operational 
characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties. Although these fuels have been safely handled 
and stored for many years at DOE storage facilities, historical data, such as fuel fabrication, operations, 
and storage records, are incomplete or questionable for many of these fuels. If needed to demonstrate 
compliance with repository license criteria, existing data may not meet current quality assurance 
requirements. Characterization of these fuels would be extremely costly. And an individually calculated 
radionuclide inventory for each fuel would require a substantial calculational effort with results that 
would inherit the uncertainty of the inputs. As an alternative, a methodology that relies on minimal 
information for developing a conservative source term estimate for DOE SNFs was developed. 
The source term methodology was developed by a team of experts representing each DOE storage 
site. The methodology is based on calculational techniques that have been successfully applied at the 
storage sites13 supplemented by the application of similarity principles to bin fuels into groups that can 
employ precalculated ORIGEN outputs to model the generation of activation products and transuranics at 
a range of decay times.14
By modeling various combinations of reactor moderator, fuel enrichment, fuel compound, and fuel 
cladding, templates have been developed to reasonably model a broad range of DOE SNF. These 
templates provide inventories for 145 radionuclides at 10 different decay periods, ranging from 5 to 
100 years following irradiation. To estimate a SNF source term, an appropriate template is selected to 
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model the production of activation products and transuranics by matching four selected parameters 
(reactor moderator, the fuel cladding, the fuel compound, and the fuel enrichment). Conservative 
assumptions can be applied if one or more of these four parameters are unknown. Precalculated 
radionuclide inventories are extracted from the selected template at the desired decay period and then 
scaled to account for differences in fuel mass and specific burnup. If burnup information is not available, 
conservative assumptions are used. Consequently, the methodology includes an algorithm for estimating 
burnup, using available information that, in some cases, may consist of no more than the end-of-life 
heavy metal mass.  
Because it can be employed to conservatively estimate radionuclide inventories and the associated 
source term, decay heat, and photon emission rate for virtually any SNF, this source term estimating 
methodology may also be useful to support design and safety considerations associated with damaged or 
poorly characterized spent fuel. 
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Appendix A 
NAC-1E Event Chronology 
In July 1980, the NAC-1E cask, which was operated by the (then) Nuclear Assurance 
Corporation (now) NAC International (NAC), was loaded with a failed fuel assembly, which 
underwent further cladding degradation in transport. As a consequence of the cladding 
degradation, the cask was internally contaminated with spent fuel residue. The documentation 
surrounding this event is very limited as it was sealed in the settlement agreement between the 
affected parties. The dates used in this summary are approximate. 
In July 1980, the NAC-1E cask was loaded with a fuel assembly classified as failed 
(greater than pinhole leaks or hairline cracks in the fuel cladding), at the Connecticut Yankee 
reactor. The cavity was filled with air (not an inert gas) for transport. The failed fuel and air cover 
gas configuration was an authorized fuel configuration by the then current Certificate of 
Compliance 6698. The Certificate further limited the thermal output of the transported fuel to less 
than 2,000 watts. 
Following loading, and in preparation for transport, it was found that the external radiation 
limits of the cask exceeded the value allowed by transport regulations (10 mrem/hr at 10 ft). At 
that time, Conneticut Yankee verified the assembly parameters and determined that with the 
assistance of NAC, an exemption to use external shielding would be requested. This exemption 
was obtained, but delayed the immediate transport of the fuel to the Battelle Memorial West 
Jefferson facility (Battelle) where the fuel was to be evaluated to determine the cause of the 
cladding failure. 
Transport to Battelle was uneventful. The cask was received at Battelle and handled 
normally. During the unloading process, Battelle personnel loosen the cask closure lid and filled 
the cask with water. The cask was lowered into the Battelle unloading pool (approximately 
40 feet deep, with the top of the cask approximately 23 ft underwater) and the lid was removed. 
On removal of the lid, a column of “hot” water rose to the surface of the pool. The cask cavity 
water was hot (approximately 200qF) relative to the unloading pool water temperature 
(approximately 80qF) and had entrained in it a significant (very large) quantity of fuel particulate. 
A significant portion of that particulate became airborne, which severely contaminated the 
unloading pool area. 
Battelle personnel, after taking some recovery actions, completed unloading the cask and 
transferred the failed fuel to a storage rack. 
Subsequent investigation showed that the thermal output, and radiological source term, of 
the fuel assembly exceeded that authorized by the certificate of compliance. As a consequence of 
the higher heat load, the hottest (center) fuel rod was estimated to have reached a temperature of 
approximately 430qC. This high temperature facilitated the scavenging of oxygen from the air by 
the exposed fuel at the points of cladding failure, creating U3O8. This larger molecule enlarged 
the existing cladding breaks allowing this conversion of additional exposed fuel. 
[Note: This particular scavenging phenomenon was previously unknown. The 
demonstration of its occurrence by this event caused the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
revise all spent fuel cask certificates to require the use of an inert gas (helium, argon or nitrogen) 
as a cover gas in spent fuel shipments.] 
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Upon flooding the cask with water in preparation for placing it in the unloading pool, there 
was a spalling of the fuel material from the fuel rods as the water converted to steam, and the fuel 
material subsequently became highly mobile. Both a high temperature and a high radiation level 
were evidenced at the vent line of the cask, which discharged into the unloading pool. Use of the 
open vent line precluded any significant pressure buildup in the cask cavity during the flooding 
process. In addition, the lid of the cask was loosened (4 of 6 bolts removed, 2 finger tight), and 
the cask pressure rupture disk and pressure relief valve were in place and operational. These 
conditions prevented the cask cavity pressure from approaching the design limit (1,100 psig). 
Based on evaluation of the water flow rate and vent line operation, the cask cavity pressure 
during flooding was estimated to be approximately 50 psig. 
In its evaluation of the NAC-1E event, NAC determined that  
x The maximum temperature reached by the fuel (approximately 430qC or 800qF as 
determined by Battelle) was much less than the maximum temperature considered in the 
safety analysis report (SAR) (1038qF)
x The maximum internal pressure was 98 psig, which is less than the pressure considered in 
the SAR of 157 psig 
x The estimated thermal output 2,300 watts, was greater than that allowed for transport 
without water in the cavity, but much less than the thermal output considered in the SAR 
(12,400 watts). 
Consequently, NAC concluded that, other than the gross internal and external contamination that 
precluded use of the cask, none of the cask parameters considered in the SAR were 
exceeded.[Note: External contamination occurred because the cask was submerged in the 
unloading pool.] 
After unloading and removal of the cask from the unloading pool, considerable effort was 
made to clean the cask of fuel debris in order to return it to service. Following some level of 
decontamination, Battelle directed that the cask be transported to another reactor in late 
July 1980. That reactor declined to use the cask based on higher than expected radiation readings 
at the vent and drain ports. 
In late August 1980, the NAC-1E cask was transported to a commercial facility in 
California for additional internal decontamination and the replacement of seals, o-rings and 
valves. Following the completion of this work, the cask was transported to a reactor in California 
for transport of fuel from the reactor to the General Electric Morris facility in Illinois. 
Based on high radiation readings and samples at the California reactor, it was determined 
that the residual levels of transuranic contamination within the cavity were still too high to allow 
opening of the cask in the reactor spent fuel pool. Based on this assessment of the condition of the 
cask, NAC reached agreement with the Sandia National Laboratory for the long-term storage of 
the contaminated cask at Sandia. This action effectively removed the NAC-1E from service. 
[Note: The opening of the cask in a commercial reactor spent fuel pool would have caused 
the pool walls and hardware, the pool water filters and the resin columns to be contaminated with 
spent fuel residue. In the commercial sector, there is no disposal facility that accepts material that 
is contaminated with transuranics. Consequently, it was considered unreasonable to risk 
contamination of plant equipment and material with fuel debris.] 
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The NAC-1E remained out of service at Sandia until March 1987. At that time, NAC 
contracted with the Department of Energy (DOE) to use the cask (provided that it could be 
returned to service) in the return of metallic fuel from a foreign research reactor. In the course of 
preparing the cask for transport from Sandia to the Savannah River Plant (SRP), it was 
determined by test that the o-rings in the cask lid had failed. Because there was no facility at 
Sandia capable of handling the cask (DOE casks are typically much smaller than commercial 
casks.), a decision was made to weld the cask closure lid to the cask body. This weld was a seal 
weld (not a structural weld) that had no effect on the performance of the cask. The cask was 
transported to SRP in April 1987. 
At SRP, the cask was externally decontaminated, and the lid weld was removed by 
grinding. The interior of the cask was decontaminated using a hydrofluoric acid bath. This 
procedure removed all traces of the transuranic contamination. [Note: This process was not 
available outside of DOE facilities.] Because the grinding operation to remove the weld resulted 
in a beveled edge on the lid of the NAC-1E that did not look exactly like the drawing, the beveled 
edge lid was licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an alternate lid configuration. 
The welding of the lid, and the subsequent qualification of the beveled configuration, was also 
carefully reviewed by the DOE prior to the authorization that allowed use of the NAC-1E in the 
foreign reactor fuel transport program. The DOE review showed that the weld operation that was 
performed, the weld removal, and the cosmetic repair of the lid (resulting in the bevel) and cask 
top surface had no effect on the performance or operation of the cask. 
Following completion of the decontamination, NAC replaced some components and 
performed the necessary tests to show that the cask met all the conditions of its Certificate. [Note: 
In 1985, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission withdrew Certificate of Compliance 6698 and 
issued Certificate of Compliance 9183. This change in certificates was not related to the NAC-1E 
event. It occurred primarily as a condition of the licensing of casks for transport of the metallic 
fuel that would be moved in the foreign research reactor program.] 
On October 26, 1987, NAC advised the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the NAC-1E 
had been repaired, tested, and returned to service in accordance with the conditions of its 
certificate. 
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Appendix B 
Tory IIA Fuel and Packaging Description 
The Tory fuel was used in a test reactor intended to propel a military missile with a nuclear 
ramjet. The theory was that air, forced into a duct as the missile flew, would be heated by the 
reactor, causing it to expand and exhaust out the back and provide thrust. The code name for the 
missile was Pluto. Tory was the code name for the propulsion reactor. Tory IIA was the first 
reactor design. Project Pluto was initiated in 1955, and the reactor first achieved criticality in 
May 1961. The fuel was shipped to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (now the Idaho 
National Laboratory [INL]) from 1962 to 1964. 
Fuel properties. The fuel was fabricated as ceramic fuel tubes composed of beryllium 
oxide. The tubes had a hexagonal cross section about 7 mm across flats. The reactor contained 
over 100,000 of the fuel tubes. After the critical experiments, the fuel tubes were removed from 
the reactor core and crushed to particles varying in size from 5 cm to 10 microns. The crushed 
fuel was then compacted into the shipping containers. 
Fuel Package Description. Prior to shipment to the INL, the crushed fuel elements were 
placed in “primary shipping containers made” of 21.188-in.-long 6061-T6 aluminum tubing. The 
tubing has a 4-1/2-in. outside diameter and a 0.188-in.-thick wall with a 0.125-in.-thick bottom 
plate welded in place. After many years of water storage, the aluminum cans were found to be 
severely corroded and leaking. Therefore, each of the primary shipping containers was placed 
into an open-top fuel storage bucket for Tory IIA fuel cans to maintain configuration. The fuel 
storage bucket is made from 5-in.-outside diameter aluminum tube with a 0.125-in.-thick wall and 
a welded bottom plate. Then prior to transfer to another basin storage facility, the fuel storage 
buckets containing the original primary shipping containers were overpacked into new stainless-
steel cans. These new cans are 52.4 in. long and made of 5-in. Schedule 10 pipe. The can has a 
bolted plate for a lid with a pivoting bail. The lids do not seal, and the cans are full of water. The 
cans have no drain holes. 
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1. CONTAINMENT DESIGNS 
1.1 J-tubes 
Many damaged spent nuclear fuel (SNF) canisters are designed to facilitate continued wet storage 
of the fuel while containing the radionuclide activity that can be released from breached cladding. 
Containing the released activity is important from the standpoint of radiological protection of personnel 
and waste generated by more frequent replenishment of basin deioinizer resin beds, which are caused by 
higher basin water activity levels. A common design feature for these cans was a J-tube in the lid of the 
canister (Figure 1). The J-tube is similar to a P-trap on a household sink. Once sufficient gases that are 
released from the damaged SNF and generated from radiolytic decay build up at the top of the can, the 
internal water environment becomes separated from the main basin. 
J-tube designs have evolved to incorporate operational improvements. The original design of the 
tube made it susceptible to buildup of silt. As such, it was unknown if the tube remained unobstructed. 
The original design was also subject to activity release during handling because of a loss of the gas 
pocket. Once the gas pocket was gone, it could take a number of weeks before enough gas would build 
back up to isolate the canister internals from the main basin, while releasing some activity. The last 
canister designed used a modified version of the J-tube (Figure 2). As can be seen the tube/passage is 
inverted and not susceptible to silt buildup. Also, it takes very little gas buildup to separate the two water 
environments. 
Figure 1. Old style J-tube design. 
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Figure 2. Latest J-tube design used on oversized can. 
1.2 Zeolite Storage Canister
A more effective means for containing radionuclide activity generated from damaged or corroded 
SNFs has been developed and used. This design modifies a standard storage canister to receive a zeolite-
filled lid. This design (Figure 3) is effective in containing radionuclide activity while preventing a buildup 
of flammable gases generated by radiolysis of the water within the canister. The zeolite acts as an ion 
exchange medium between the storage pool (low activity water) and the water (high activity) within the 
canister. Flow through the bundle is achieved via the thermal gradient created by the decay heat of the 
SNF.
Figure 3. Zeolite-capped bundle. 
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1.3 MARK 0, II, AND II FUEL STORAGE CANISTER
For underwater storage of zircaloy clad, uranium metal fuel at the Hanford Site, canister designs 
evolved from those originally intended to support transfer and feed of fuel to reprocessing systems. Each 
canister had two barrels that held up to seven elements vertically. Mark 0 canisters (see Figure 4) had 
screen bottoms and open tops and were fabricated from aluminum. These canisters were not intended for 
extended fuel storage and did not adequately confine fuel and fuel-water reaction products from the 
storage environment. Later designs (Mark I and Mark II canisters) (see Figure 5) had solid bottoms and 
sealable tops. Each sealed canister barrel was vented through an external gas trap to prevent any buildup 
of pressure within the canister. The Mark I canisters were made of either aluminum or stainless steel. The 
Mark I lid seal used a Grafoil gasket that could inadvertently fall into the canister during lid removal and 
be introduced into the fuel reprocessing systems, causing potential pluggage of process equipment. The 
Mark II canisters (see Figure 6) were the final generation of underwater storage canisters, were fabricated 
from stainless steel to eliminate corrosion issues experienced with aluminum canisters, and included an 
improved lid seal design. 
Figure 4. Mark 0 aluminum canister. 
Figure 5. Mark 0, I, and II canisters. 
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Figure 6. Mark II stainless steel canister. 
All three types of canisters were filled under water. The fuel, water, and gas volumes in the 
canisters varied with the type and condition of the fuel. When the Mark I and Mark II canisters were 
originally filled with fuel and closed, the top 2.5 in. of water in each barrel were displaced with inert 
nitrogen gas. In some instances, the canister lid locking bar (martensitic type 416 stainless steel, heat 
treated to a high stress level) was observed to be broken or cracked, creating concern over loss of the 
nitrogen gas from the canister. This was believed to have been caused from hydrogen-induced cracking. 
Hydrogen generated in the canister during storage could also displace nitrogen from the canister. The 
closed lids also enabled use of potassium nitrite, an oxygen scavenger, to inhibit corrosion during storage. 
The potassium nitrite was added prior to sealing of the canisters. The lidded Mark I and Mark II canister 
designs combined with basin water control systems did effectively control contamination levels within the 
storage basin. 
1.4 Rod Consolidation Assembly
Fuel pins were removed from commercial origin Boiling Water Reactor and Pressurized Water 
Reactor spent fuel assemblies for various examinations in support of repository performance assessment 
testing. A rod consolidation assembly was designed to enable handling and ensure geometry control for 
criticality safety during subsequent handling and storage of the fuel pins (see Figure 7). The assembly 
design used a standard commercial fuel lifting fixture to enable handling at a fuel handling facility 
without unique tools. The bottom of the assembly includes a perforated plate to enable helium contact 
with the fuel rods for vacuum drying and inerting, while maintaining particulate confinement for any 
potentially damaged fuel. 
Figure 7. Rod consolidation assembly (shown with temporary lifting fixture). 
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2. LID CLOSURE DESIGNS 
Several lid designs have been used for the SNF canisters. The designs incorporate specific features 
to facilitate underwater opening and closure operations. These features include keepered lid bolts, special 
conical shaped bolts, and lid alignment pins. 
Bolted lids have the advantage of easy installation and removal. In many cases, other style lids 
(welded, screw top and tabbed), while easily installed, do not incorporate an easy method of opening the 
can. The disadvantage to bolted lids is that they usually require a flange that reduces the canister opening 
or increases the storage cell size relative to the size SNF that can be placed in the canister. 
2.1 Keepered Lid Bolt 
The keepered lid bolt is a bolt that is retained in the canister lid via a partially threaded bolt hole. 
This feature allows for easy installation of the lid with no need to handle small loose bolts in remote 
situations. Typically, the bolt hole is tapped slightly less than the thread length on the bolt. The remainder 
of the hole is unthreaded. The bolt for the lid is only threaded on the bottom section, with the threads 
removed from the upper portion (typically equal to the thickness of the lid flange material). Failure to 
properly design the lid bolt holes can cause cross-threading during installation. 
Figure 8 is a cross section of a typical keepered lid bolt arrangement.
2.2 Lid Bolt Strength 
Lid bolts are designed with criticality accident scenarios in mind. In most cases, the lid will be 
significant to containing the material and maintaining geometry control of the damaged SNF in or near an 
array of other SNF. The frequency or potential for incorrect installation of the lid is mitigated by making 
one bolt capable of sustaining the entire load imposed during handling. This reduces the frequency of 
failure as there is a preengineered solution to improper fastening of lid bolts during installation.  
2.3 Cone Shape Bolts 
Design of fastener heads incorporates a conical shape above the standard hex head (Figure 8). This 
allows for easier remote engagement of the socket/tool on the bolt. 
2.4 Lid Alignment Pins 
Lid designs incorporate alignment pins, which allow for proper alignment of lid on the storage 
canister. The keepered lid bolt, alignment pins, and cone-shaped bolts were used on the zeolite-capped 
bundle (Section 1.2) as shown in Figure 9. In this case, the alignment pins do not fit into the traditional 
holes, but instead use the canister opening shape to guide the pins. This allows for a larger canister 
opening.
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Figure 8. Typical keepered lid bolt layout. 
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Figure 9. Keepered lid bolt and cone bolt detail for zeolite capped bundle. 
2.5 Tabbed Lid Closures 
Tabbed lids are used where space is critical and a bolted lid attachment is not feasible. Tabbed lids 
use a load bar to sustain the loads imposed during handling; the tab merely maintains the orientation of 
the lid such that the load bar is properly positioned. Tabs have been used in several bundle designs from a 
canister type design to an open suitcase-type design (Figure 10). 
The benefits of the tabbed lid closure are easy installation and verification of proper installation. 
During installation, the tabs are simply bent into position using a handling tool and verified by visual 
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inspection (utilizing underwater camera, binoculars, or by eye). This design utilizes less material, which is 
advantageous when the material’s ultimate disposition is to be dissolved, such as during reprocessing. 
Additionally, design of a tabbed lid closure is simpler than that of a bolt type closure. This feature is most 
effective when the amount of tabbing (degree of bend) is not a critical design feature. 
The drawbacks to the tabbed lid closure involve the difficulty in opening a tabbed canister. This 
requires cutting the canister open, which introduces an accident scenario of cutting thru SNF. There is 
also a potential for breaking a tab off during lid installation, which requires repackaging the fuel and 
disposing of the damaged canister. 
2.6 Other Lid Closure Designs 
There are several alternative lid designs that use concepts from both the tabbed and bolted design 
features described. One design uses a cam lock style lid that has four posts (see Figure 11), which engage 
in precut openings of the canister. This style lid is maintained closed by engaging a single bolt in the 
corner of the canister/lid, which prevents the lid from rotating. Another style lid uses the bundle and lid 
shown in Figure 10. The lid is modified by removal of the tabs and installation of a block, which contains 
an internal bolt. The lid is installed in the same manner as the tabbed lid, with the bolt performing the 
function of the tab when backed out (Figure 12). 
Figure 10. Tabbed closure examples: EBS-Bundle (left), Savannah River Site Fuel Bundle (top right), 
inner canister (bottom right). 
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Figure 11. Typical lid lifting bail (left) and rigging point on bottom of bundle (right). 
Figure 12. Alternate lid style. 
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The advantages of these style lids are the combination of the ease of installation of the tabbed style 
lid and the ease of removal of the bolt style lid. The disadvantage to this style lid is the tight 
manufacturing tolerances required to ensure the lid does not rotate enough to disengage from the canister. 
3. OTHER DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
3.1 Bail or Handling Fixtures 
In many cases the lifting fixture of the container has been attached to the container’s lid. This is not 
typically a problem for empty light-weight canisters. However, a drawback to this design is that 
manipulation without the lid is difficult. Further, for heavy containers, it can be difficult to lift the 
containers from the lid, and lifting fixtures on the canister body should then be considered. This issue 
becomes evident when removing damaged SNF from a previously loaded canister. A typical lifting bail is 
shown in Figure 11. 
Often when designing a container’s lifting fixture, little consideration is given to the next evolution 
for the fuel package. As a specific example, pivoting lifting bails (see Figure 13, Container A) are 
convenient in a water storage environment, but a lifting bail may be difficult to engage with a remote tool 
in a dry cell. If a lifting bail must be used, it is good to design the bail such that when it falls to a 
horizontal orientation, a gap remains between the lid and the bail sufficient for a tool to slide under the 
bail. In the design illustrated by Container A in Figure 13, the lifting bail rests on the bolt head leaving 
room for a tool. 
Lifting fixture designs that accommodate both environments can be devised. Container B in 
Figure 13 shows a 12-cm-diameter container that is designed to allow handling with three methods. The 
can, with the lid secured in the J-slots, can be lifted from the metal tab on the lid with simple underwater 
tools. Or it can easily be engaged remotely with a tool that drops over the tab and then latched in the slot. 
The container can also be handled without the lid affixed by lifting it from the square slots or the J-slots at 
the top of the can. 
The lid for Container B is affixed to the container as shown in Figure 14. The lid is fabricated with 
the round bar of the lifting fixture being threaded, as is the triangular lid piece. After the triangular lid 
piece is threaded onto the rod, the circular lid piece is welded to the bottom of the rod. The lid is secured 
to the can by placing the three tabs into bottom of the J-slots and rotating the lifting fixture clockwise. 
The rotation causes the triangular lid piece to move up until it is fully engaged in the J-slots. 
Design of lifting points on canisters should also take into consideration the possible need to rotate 
the container from vertical to horizontal, consideration of overall container weight, and the different loads 
imposed on the bail or handling fixture. 
C-11
Container A Container B
Figure 13. Two additional container lifting fixture designs. 
Figure 14. Lid engagement. 
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3.2 Canister Identification 
The combination of SNF assembly damage and emplacement in a canister renders the unique 
assembly identification useless. Unique identification is typically applied to the canister for traceability 
and accountability. Typically canister identification has been accomplished by using indelible ink 
markers. This method has been shown to work for a reasonably long period of time. However, because of 
the unexpected extended storage times, facilities are finding that the ink fades or wears off. This is even 
true for items rarely handled and markings in areas that do not ever experience contact with other 
surfaces. A recent practice has been developed, which involves engraving the bundle/canister lids to 
provide for long-term identification. In order to address the previously stored bundles, tags with engraved 
identifications have been designed and are being installed. Although the engraved identification numbers 
are readable underwater, they are filled in with low chloride indelible ink for better visibility (see 
Figure 15). Notice that the design of the tag allows for easy installation over the bail, but an angled tab 
prevents the tag from falling off even when the bundle is handled horizontally. 
3.3 Fuel Free Zone 
The fuel free zone is a region preengineered into the bundle design that is a known safe location to 
cut the canister. Cutting the canister open is necessary when it does not have a bolted/screwed lid or the 
bolted/screw lid is not functioning properly. This feature is especially important when dealing with 
damaged fuel, which results in smaller pieces and parts whose location inside a canister may be hard to 
anticipate. Many new canister designs have incorporated a fuel free zone design feature that ensures a 
safe location to cut the canister and gain access to the fuel. An example of the fuel free zone is the bottom 
region of the inner canister, shown in Figure 16. This feature can also be used to provide criticality 
spacing where required. 
Figure 15. Etched and filled in identification tag. 
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Figure 16. Inner canister fuel free zone. 
3.4 Flushing/Sampling Connections 
Flushing/sampling connections are provided on canisters that act as a containment boundary 
between SNF and the storage pool water. These connections provide a means for sampling the internal 
water environment and flushing prior to opening. This allows for better characterization of the hazards 
involved with opening the canister and a more controlled release of the activity into the storage pool. 
Flushing the canister prior to opening has the added advantage of reducing waste volume as a portable 
filtration/deionization system can be used, minimizing the impacts on the storage pools system. 
3.5 Drop Analysis 
The primary function of the canister is to maintain the geometry of the SNF consistent with the 
criticality analysis. This includes credible drop accidents and handling events. Simple impact limiters and 
crush zones have been used to absorb the energy of a canister drop without negatively impacting the 
contained SNF or releasing the contents (See Figure 17). 
Figure 17. Simple impact limiter. 
3.6 Thermodynamic Design Considerations 
The design of the storage canister needs to consider the potential heat buildup and ensure the SNF 
is not negatively affected, which could result in a variance from the criticality analysis. Typically, this is 
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accomplished by designing canisters such that water flows through the bundle or storage rack via 
convection.
3.7 Canister Materials 
Storage canister materials should be chosen to minimize corrosion of SNF cladding. For sealed 
canisters with an inert atmosphere, the canister material will not impact the SNF cladding corrosion. In 
unsealed canisters or sealed canisters with a moist atmosphere, the canister and SNF cladding materials 
should be similar. If the canister and SNF cladding materials are different, galvanic couples are created. 
The SNF cladding metal should be the less reactive metal (cathode) in the galvanic couple. Aluminum is a 
more reactive metal than stainless steel or zirconium. Stainless steel or zirconium clad SNFs can be stored 
in aluminum canisters, but aluminum clad SNFs should not be stored in stainless steel canisters. Another 
driving force in a galvanic couple is a large cathode to anode ratio. Stainless steel canisters are acceptable 
in aluminum racks, but aluminum canisters should not be stored in stainless steel racks. 
Another consideration for canister materials is the final end state of the SNF. The canister materials 
should be compatible with the transportation and final disposition requirements for the SNF. For example, 
SNF that is destined for a dissolution process should be canned in material compatible with that process. 
Uranium and uranium/zirconium metal SNFs should be stored in canisters allowing for expansion 
of UO2 corrosion product. The UO2 density is about 50% of the uranium metal density, so the uranium 
corrosion product will occupy about twice the volume of the original uranium SNF. If the SNF is tightly 
packed, the canister might burst. This has occurred within the DOE complex. 
3.8 In-Canister Criticality of Degraded SNF 
In-canister criticality of degraded SNF is an accident scenario where the SNF degrades into a more 
reactive configuration. Canister design should incorporate features to maintain configuration if degraded 
SNF is subject to criticality concerns. Examples of this would be compartmentalized canister inserts or 
placement of smaller canisters within a larger canister, thereby maintaining the analyzed configuration of 
the SNF. Maintaining a critically safe geometry is a consideration any where damaged or degraded SNF 
may accumulate (e.g., beneath storage racks). 
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